The presentation of Vyacheslav Nikonov’s book Russia’s Downfall: 1917 was held in late September at Moscow State University. In this comprehensive work, the executive director of the Russkiy Mir Foundation examines the nature of revolution as seen from the prospective of modernity.

Here the word ‘downfall’ as Vyacheslav Nikonov understands it is that “which caused the breakdown of the traditional form of statehood, caused the country to cease to be a actor on the international political arena, to become a battlefield of civil strife and localized foreign intervention, to suffer colossal human casualties, lose enormous amounts of territory and be thrown back dozens of years in economic development – that which called into question its survival as a state and as a nation.”

There have only been four such periods during the entire thousand-year history of Russia: in the 13th century under the yoke of the Golden Horde, during the Time of Troubles in the 17th century, in 1917 and during the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

“If you take the last 500 years, then there are only two countries which spent these last 500 years as sovereign states, countries which fully controlled their domestic and foreign policy: England and Russia,” said Vyacheslav Nikonov at the presentation. According to the author, in Russia “it was in February and March of 1917 in particular that the avalanche-like societal integration began.” And “comprehension of the nature of revolution, recognition of what in fact took place and why it took place in 1917 is key to understanding Russia’s downfalls and, accordingly, how to prevent them.”

Dean of the School of History at Moscow State University Sergei Karpov called Nikonov’s book an outstanding piece of work that “sets milestone in the development of our historical process and debunks many preconceptions and prejudices that have hung over our history and historiography.”  

Perhaps the greatest novelty of this book about Russia’s collapse, according to the author, is that it does not attempt to explain historical events by objective processes. “Honestly, I have never been witness to a single event that has been caused by objective processes,” Nikonov said. “There has always been a certain logic behind events which could be most readily explained by interests that rather than by objective processes. And secondly, I do not know of any methods for measuring the degree to which objective processes impact what is going on in our lives. How can they be measured?”

Yuri Petrov, Director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, took issue with this assertion: “You cannot ignore that behind this interest lies a certain process – these two things are absolutely interrelated. After all, interests arises when certain processes come to bear.” 

Based on the proposed ‘units of measurement’, Vyacheslav Nikonov came to the conclusion that the Revolution of 1917 primarily took place in February, and the most important reason for this was a conspiracy of the elite, or more precisely – “the intentional actions of politicians of a liberal and social orientation who were supported by the politically active part of the big business and subsequently managed to engage the military command.” Revolution from below is not possible without support at high levels, even during a period of economic troubles and war. And “there was no unity at the highest levels at the beginning of the 20th century an during World War I.”    

Fighting the System

The leading social group which brought the revolution on, according to Vyacheslav Nikonov, was the intelligentsia. “Nowhere in the world has the intelligentsia positioned itself in opposition to authorities as it has in Russia,” he said. They were not allowed access to power, and they did not really seek it, and thus was the tradition of turning the intelligentsia “into a force against the system, a force that did not think about how to improve and modernize the state structure but rather how to overturn it.”

At the same time the book’s author believes that the role of political parties in the February Revolution was minimal. “And enormous role in preparing for the revolution was played by such organizations as the Zemstvo and Municipal Unions and war industry committees,” said Vyacheslav Nikonov. “Their leadership was concentrated in Moscow, a center of revolutionary fervor.” The direct confrontation of the war industries committees began in 1915, when they began openly asserting that the government could not win the war, thus undermining public trust, the author said. The poorly disguised conspiracies in the Duma, aristocratic, Zemstvo-Municipal and socialist circles, which were already beginning to extend to the military command, were known to Russian special services. But these highly placed conspirators were not untouchable for such. And this is what made the revolution a success, according to the author. Neither the rebellion of reserve battalions nor the panicky atmosphere among the public would have led to the downfall of the regime without the State Duma legitimizing the coup.

But Yuri Petrov expressed his disagreement on the theory of conspiracies: “I find it difficult to imagine how people in the military could have provoked the February demonstrations in Petrograd. It seems to me that the conspiracy approach to history could lead us done the wrong path.”

Vyacheslav Nikonov also analyzed the influence of external factor of the revolutionary movement, including the Jewish and German footprints. “Jews really were very active,” the historian said, “but they did not have access to the levers which could truly lead to the downfall of the empire. The German intelligence worked very actively on the strategy of ‘peeling the orange’ – separating Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasus, Baltic states and so on from Russia, but prior to the February Revolution Germany’s opportunities for influencing domestic processes in Russia were limited.”

On the whole the policy of the West and allies toward Russia had at least three layers. At the highest level, interaction between heads of state, the level of trust was very high. Nikolai II was even given the rank of a Field Marshal in the British Army, “which did not stop the British from supporting the Provisional Government and openly betraying him after February.” On the second level, the level of elites, the attitude toward Russia was very negative: “It was considered a dictatorship and the Russians – a half-barbaric tribe, and from this stemmed the very bad press about Russia and its leadership.” On the third level, the public-political level support was provided to opposition within the country, that is, the destabilization of the government was welcomed, and anti-Russian forces and attitudes were encouraged. On the whole, Vyacheslav Nikonov noted, “the policy of the West was rather traditional – it has rarely been different.”

It was the division of the elite and shift of the military command to the opposition that made the coup possible, forcing the emperor to abdicate, Nikonov said. He also took a few minutes to speak about Emperor Nikolai II, who has offered been accused of lacking the necessary will, and as a result losing power and subsequently the empire. “Many contemporaries recognized the exceptional composure of the emperor, whose manners bordered on modest, even shyness,” Vyacheslav Nikonov said. “But in my opinion, behind the simplicity of the Nikolai’s demeanor hid a tenacious courage based on deep convictions. He really did show indecisiveness when it came to using force, and this was seen as weakness. And in Russia we know that a ruler can be forgiven anything save weakness. In my opinion he was a good monarch as a crown bearer and a good monarch bureaucrat but he wasn’t a monarch politician, placing his hopes in fate and losing the information war.”

At the conclusion of the presentation, the author expressed his hopes that this book will provoke people to consider “how we can become better, how we can make our Russia once again, or perhaps for the first time a prosperous, future-oriented, democratic, strong and self-confident country that lives in peace with itself and the rest of the world.”

Russia’s Downfall: 1917 concludes with a listing of the fates of those people who participated in the February Revolution of 1917, both on the side of the revolutionaries and on the side of the monarchy. “And this extraordinarily interesting,” notes Sergei Karpov, “as all the loose threads are wrapped up in the end. Vyacheslav Nikonov is extremely delicate, keen and precise in these descriptions and assessments. He is a brilliant historian because he embodies the amalgam, including genetically, of the characteristics of a politician, academic historian, thinker and philosopher.  The book will undoubtedly be a great success.”